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Paleolithic Punctuations and Equilibria:
Did Retention Rather Than Invention Limit Technological Evolution?
ABSTRACT
Although the ability to add knowledge and the ability to retain knowledge are both (trivially) preconditions of cu-
mulative evolution, the latter has so far been largely neglected in cultural evolution. As we here focus on the ability 
of cultures to retain a long-term memory, what emerges is that the propensity for introducing error in information 
transmission between generations strictly bounds the volume of information that can be stably maintained over 
time. What is argued and demonstrated here is how this phenomenon could provide key insights about tempo 
and mode in Paleolithic technological evolution. The application of this patch to the basic Darwinian framework 
causes its predictions to shift in an interesting way: 1) a large and growing body of archaeological finds that seem 
outright mysterious today begin to make theoretical sense, and, 2) the importance and role of cognitive capabili-
ties changes considerably as the ability to learn and teach (rather than to invent and comprehend) is emphasized. 
INTRODUCTION
What is the similarity between the evolution of proto-biological RNA replicators and the evolution of Pa-
leolithic culture? Not much, for sure, but it is here argued 
that these two otherwise so different systems still share a 
fundamental structural similarity and that, because of this 
likeness, they both face the same “memory problem.” This 
structural similarity can be summarized into two critical 
characteristics: 1) they both rely on a dynamics of infor-
mation transfer between short-term memory carriers to 
achieve a long-term memory; and, 2) the rate of noise in this 
transfer is comparatively high. But to see what this means, 
and what expressions this memory problem can take, we 
must take a moment to look at what insights its research 
has provided in evolutionary biology.
The memory problem in question and its causes have 
been well researched in population genetics and since it is 
better understood as a non-linear dynamics phenomenon 
than as something inherently biological, many of the mod-
els that have been used are generic and highly useful also 
for our purposes. Its discovery and exploration began with 
a paper by Eigen and Schuster (1977) where the relation-
ship between the length of genetic sequences and the rate of 
error in replication was investigated. It is obvious that if no 
mutations occur, then no adaptation is possible. But what 
happens if we adjust the mutation rate upwards? At first 
there are no surprises—the rate of adaptation increases. But 
then, all of a sudden, at a critical mutation rate, the whole 
system collapses in what is referred to in the literature as 
an “error catastrophe.” What happens is that the system 
of short-term memory carriers can no longer maintain a 
long-term memory—not only can the system not adapt fur-
ther, it also loses everything that it had previously gained. 
If you keep the mutation rate fixed and instead adjust the 
sequence length upwards, you invoke exactly the same ef-
fect. The conclusion is that mutation rates determine the 
amount of information that can be maintained over time.
The question thus becomes, did Paleolithic cultures 
somehow effectively solve their memory problem by (as 
happened for higher life forms) reducing the likelihood of 
errors to close to zero? Although social transmission error 
is harder to quantify, most would probably agree that they 
did not solve this problem. Even today we must carefully 
search and study our persistent, systematic, and widely 
available records to recall past events in any greater detail. 
This is so even within our own lifetimes and historical facts 
are constantly under the threat of being counterfeited even 
in the presence of living witnesses. If we then are dealing 
with Paleolithic cultures, lacking nearly all our external in-
formation media, over hundreds and thousands of genera-
tions, it would be very hard to argue that error in trans-
mission could be practically neglected. To the contrary, by 
all indications it was substantial. From this perspective, 
Paleolithic technology evolution indeed does begin to look 
more like the evolution of primitive RNA replicators than 
like the evolution of higher life forms with their exquisitely 
sophisticated mechanisms for error correction.
So we have every reason to seriously nurture the idea 
that the rate of transmission error invoked the exact same 
phenomenon in Paleolithic cultural evolution as it does in 
biology, although of course in a different guise; i.e., that 
it imposed a bone hard constraint on evolution by limit-
ing the amount of information that could be carried over 
long expanses of time. This constraint is here referred to 
as a “Glass Ceiling” (for reasons that will become clearer 
further on) against which ever so inventive and intelli-
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cognition, and culture linked to technology? What causes 
stasis and punctuation in technological evolution?
The predominating explanatory logic basically holds 
that physiological adaptations—visible in skeletal remains 
or not—provided hominids with a technological potential. 
The levels of technological sophistication that we see ex-
pressed during the major eras would then represent the 
best the hominids in question could comprehend and in-
vent given their present cognitive capability. Consequent-
ly, transitions between the major eras would correspond 
to changes in cognitive capabilities. This is, of course, any-
thing but a far-fetched hypothesis. After all, intelligence 
and complex technology together strongly characterize the 
Homo genus and they both emerged during the same pe-
riod of time. Furthermore, since technology clearly seems 
to be highly adaptive, a rapid exploitation of any poten-
tial to invent better technology appears inevitable already 
on the most basic reading of Darwinian logic. It is unlikely 
that this view of technological evolution would simply be 
flat wrong in an uninteresting way. To the contrary, the 
challenge that it poses is strong and no serious attempt at 
explaining the evolutionary patterns of Paleolithic technol-
ogy evolution can ignore it. As Klein remarks:
 
“If the stratigraphic associations and age estimates at 
both sites [Katanda and Blombos Cave] are accepted, 
they could imply that modern human behavioral traits 
and modern morphology arose in Africa together, at 
or before 100 ky ago, and we will have to explain why 
novel behavior that was probably highly adaptive re-
mained geographically localized for tens of thousands of 
years.”(Klein 2000).
But there is more to motivate us to accept this chal-
lenge than just a few out-of-sync archaeological oddities. 
The body of observations that hang in theoretical limbo is 
substantial, and far from having gone away with better dat-
ing techniques, the dating and integrity of these finds have 
been largely confirmed and their numbers have swelled. 
First off, the physiological and cultural histories of the 
Homo genus are only somewhat in sync and less and less 
so the closer we get to present times (Ambrose, 2001; Foley 
and Lahr 2003). For example, and perhaps in particular, we 
seem to have two instances of technology emerging well 
after major changes in preserved physiology: 1) H. ergaster 
and the Acheulean; and, 2) H. sapiens and the Upper Paleo-
lithic (UP)/Later Stone Age (LSA) (Ambrose 2001; Henshil-
wood 2004; Henshilwood and Marean 2006; Hovers and 
Kuhn 2006; Klein and Edgar 2002; McBrearty and Brooks 
2000; Minichillo 2006). The lag between H. ergaster and the 
earliest Acheulean (Asfaw et al. 1992) is on the order of a 
few hundred millennia and the lack of large bifaces in asso-
ciation with Southeast Asian H. erectus has been attributed 
to H. ergaster spreading throughout the Old World before 
the emergence of the Acheulean (Ambrose 2001; Foley and 
Lahr 2003)1. The time lag between physiologically modern 
H. sapiens and the widespread cultural richness of the UP/
LSA is at least around 150 ka (McDougall et al. 2005) but 
gent hominids would have to bump their heads. This pa-
per hence joins in the recent choir (see, e.g., Powell et al. 
2010; Palmer 2010) calling for more attention to retention of 
knowledge in cultural evolution.
We here introduce and provide this idea with some 
preliminary nurturing. What is proposed is that the Glass 
Ceiling effect is a constraint on technology accumulation 
that matches the description of what is missing from the 
Darwinian account of long-term patterns in technology 
evolution—both in terms of micro processes and macro 
patterns. This constraint would put a strict limit on the 
complexity of technological repertoires and its level would 
not be determined by intelligence but instead by the fidel-
ity of information (and thereby knowledge, which will be 
discussed shortly) transfer between generations. With this 
rather minor patch to the Darwinian framework, a large 
and growing body of observations, which will be summa-
rized shortly, become expected and unremarkable rather 
than impossible and outright mysterious—the predicted 
and the observed evolutionary patterns are considerably 
harmonized. We thereby move into focus the problem of 
how achieved knowledge is even retained in the first place, 
raising the possibility that looking to intelligence, inven-
tiveness, and environmental factors alone for explaining 
tempo and mode in Paleolithic technological evolution 
could be a mistake.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. First, the 
width of the gap between theory and empirical observation 
of evolutionary patterns and events is briefly reviewed. 
Then, the use of a replicator dynamics as a model of long-
term knowledge evolution is explained and defended, 
clarifying what is meant in this paper by terms such as 
knowledge, information, and fidelity. After that, a maximal-
ly abstract and transparent model, aimed at isolating the 
Glass Ceiling phenomenon, is introduced and analyzed. 
The question about what the Glass Ceiling would mean, 
and could lead to, on the level of the hominid and social 
groups is then discussed. After discussing some models ad-
dressing similar topics, the results are then used to yield a 
new theoretical take on observations that so far have not 
been possible to harmonize with evolutionary explana-
tions.
POORLY EXPLAINED
EVOLUTIONARY PATTERNS
It seems more accurate to say that the punctuated equilib-
rium view of Paleolithic technological evolution has been 
elaborated than to say that it has been weakened with re-
cent better dating and more finds. What we see throughout 
almost the entire 2.5 mya history of preserved human tech-
nology are prolonged periods of non-directional change 
punctuated by brief periods of directional change, e.g., 
Hovers and Kuhn (2006). However, despite the improving 
empirical picture, it will be argued in this section that the 
major features of Paleolithic technological evolution re-
main poorly understood theoretically. As a consequence, 
even basic questions about causal relationships cannot be 
properly addressed. For example, how is environment, 
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persistently remained higher than the typical expressed 
level of technology. But how could this be possible in terms 
of actual evolutionary dynamics? This is the strong chal-
lenge illustrated above with a quote from Klein (2000). This 
fundamental Darwinian challenge must be met on its own 
fundamental level and that is also where the present work 
attempts to meet it.
KNOWLEDGE AND
INFORMATION DYNAMICS
The present work addresses these questions by pointing to 
a family of quite abstract phenomena that are inherent to a 
broad class of information transmission processes. As is ev-
ident from the introduction, pursuing explanations based 
on information transmission is far from novel in general, 
but as Eerkens and Lipo (2005, 2007) note, it is quite new in 
archaeology and paleoanthropology where they argue that 
such models hold a considerable untapped explanatory po-
tential. In this section we argue why Paleolithic technologi-
cal evolution can be studied in such a way.
Cultural knowledge comes to reappear from gen-
eration to generation in humans, who at birth possess no 
knowledge that is specific to the culture within which they 
will come to find themselves. Whether it is fruitful to speak 
of this recurrence as replication or not has no universal an-
swer—it depends on the time scale and purpose of our in-
quiry. We here only seek to argue for the suitability of noisy 
replication as a model for our purposes; it is a different issue 
whether or not it is a good model for other purposes3.
The crucial features of replication that we are after here 
have nothing to do with mechanistic carbon copying, and 
neither do they hinge on the presence of any such process 
at this or any lower levels. What we are after is the neces-
sity for information to “make jumps” between short-lived 
physical carriers, the risk of failing to make such jumps and 
disappearing as a result, or to become altered, so to speak, 
in midair. A replicator dynamics embodies these features, 
isolates them, brings them out, and is, moreover, theoreti-
cally convenient given the theoretical body from which we 
will proceed.
What we specifically consider is technological knowl-
edge and by this we mean the ability of hominids to per-
form actions directly or indirectly related to technology. 
For example, a knapper who has the ability to work a Lev-
allois core we say has the knowledge to do this. Knowledge 
is passed on directly to others who sense the knower in 
various ways such as actions and speech, and indirectly 
via artifacts, sites, and features of the environment from 
which knowledge can be inferred. It seems safe to assume 
that many modalities of knowledge transfer were (as they 
now are) used together in mutually complementing and 
supporting communication systems. What we have to ar-
gue is that crucial parts of culturally persistent technologi-
cal knowledge could have survived only by making these 
risky jumps. If so, constraints inherent to such an informa-
tion dynamics would be constraints on technology.
The type of knowledge that we will be considering in 
the models in this paper is what we might call Knower-To-
perhaps even longer (McBrearty and Brooks 2000).
Even if we postulate adaptations that do not show up 
in skeletal remains (see Coolidge and Wynn 2006; Diamond 
1992; Klein 1995, 2000; Wynn and Coolidge 2004; and, for 
an overview, Klein and Edgar 2002), we still have grave 
problems such as early (and often recursive)2 appearances 
of technology (Bar-Yosef and Kuhn 1999; Bednarik 2003; 
Belfer-Cohen and Hovers 1992; Delagnes and Meignen 
2006; D’Errico et al. 2005; Henshilwood and D’Errico 2005; 
Henshilwood et al. 2002; Lombard 2005; McBrearty and 
Brooks 2000; McBrearty and Tryon 2006; Shea 2003), the 
so-called transitional H. neanderthalensis cultures of Eurasia 
(Hublin 2000; Floss 2003; Marks and Chabai 2006; Mellars 
2000; Straus 2005; Zilhão 2006) and Holocene recursive 
technological evolution in modern H. sapiens, most nota-
bly in Tasmania where some (Henrich 2004) argue that the 
toolkit underwent severe maladaptive depletion following 
the geographical isolation of Tasmania about 10,000 years 
ago, after the last glacial period.
The old view that the major technological eras were 
rather uninteresting periods of little or no change also have 
been much elaborated recently. For instance, in a volume 
on the finer anatomy of the Middle Stone Age (MSA)/Mid-
dle Paleolithic (MP) (Hovers and Kuhn 2006), while con-
tributors are nearly unanimous in the judgement that the 
period displays much temporal and geographical hetero-
geneity, they are at the same time in wide agreement that 
very little long-term trends and directions can be discerned. 
The observed pattern of change was characterized as “go-
ing nowhere fast”—technological elements appear and 
disappear, while the core Mousterian technology remains 
remarkably intact, in fact even down to minute details of 
the chaînes opératoires (see Bar-Yosef 2006).
But not only this, reasoning from expressed technol-
ogy to cognitive capability also is fraught with both logical 
and empirical problems (see, e.g., Davies and Underdown 
2006; Henshilwood and Marean 2003; Hovers and Belfer-
Cohen 2006; Mellars 1991, 1996; Renfrew 2001). We do not 
have to look far for examples of this—nobody explains the 
technological chasm between today and the world a mil-
lennium ago by an evolution of cognitive capabilities and 
neither does anyone view the Paleolithic technology level 
of some primitive modern cultures as the result of a physi-
ological inferiority of their members. The presence of such 
“unexploited potential,” furthermore does not appear to be 
transitory or even unique to modern humans. It has been 
observed also in primate research, where chimpanzees 
have been found capable of types of behavior in captivity 
that they do not exhibit in the wild (see Belfer-Cohen and 
Hovers 2010, and references therein).
The problem is that these observations and logical 
problems, as strongly as they may speak, offer no com-
prehensive theoretical alternative; at least none that is not 
highly problematic from a Darwinian point of view (see, 
e.g., the foreword by Mellars in Hovers and Kuhn 2006). 
Observations do seem to suggest that the evolution of tech-
nological complexity remained under some strong con-
straint and that the cognitive ability to invent technology 
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without the stigmergic external cues provided by sites, ar-
tifacts, and the environment, it is just as impossible to con-
ceive of a technology knower who never met and learned 
from at least one other knower.
Mistakes are inevitably made and, for purely thermo-
dynamical reasons (there are more ways to destroy struc-
ture than there are ways to build it), many of these are like-
ly to be maladaptive. Also, deliberate changes, intended to 
be adaptive, often fail to be so and this is not least the case 
when the knowers lack a naturalistic understanding of the 
technological systems that they use. If we can revert to pre-
vious versions, maladaptive error may be a nuisance, but if 
we cannot do so, the nuisance turns into a slippery slope. 
Even when the loss of functionality for each error individu-
ally is low, the emergent patterns studied using the models 
to be introduced next remain (they shift quantitatively but 
not qualitatively). The basic reason for this is that even if 
small changes in technological practices have only small ef-
fects on the function of the outcome, this negligibility does 
not extrapolate trivially to a dynamics. Random walks 
stray helplessly from their points of origin, and when error 
mounts upon error in high-dimensional spaces the cumula-
tive effects of even tiny errors rapidly become dramatic5.
We furthermore need no special assumptions about the 
human brain to conclude that: 1) KTKK could come to rest 
only in brains; and, 2) brains die with their owners. Hence, 
KTKK could survive long-term only by jumping from older 
brains to younger brains, and technological knowledge was 
at the mercy of the integrity of this noisy dynamics.
Finally, with KTKK of the deep past (unlike with genes, 
computer files, or books) we do not have the luxury of hav-
ing neatly measurable symbolical expressions at our dispos-
al. It is however commonplace (Coolidge and Wynn 2006; 
Read and van der Leeuw 2008) to speak of the size of brain 
memory, measured loosely in units of number of events, 
items, relations, and so on, that can be stored and recalled. 
When we here speak of volume of knowledge it is, in the same 
vein, basically the number of things that have to be remem-
bered by a knower before it can do what the knowledge 
refers to (e.g., the knowledge to make an Acheulean hand 
axe). We also say that there is a relevant sense in which we 
can speak of sameness of knowledge, most importantly in 
relation to its persistence (and lack thereof) over time. For 
example, if we observe the presence of Levallois flaking at 
one point in time and then verify its presence in a clearly 
recognizable form again 10,000 years later, it makes sense 
to say that this knowledge has “remained unchanged.”
THE MODEL
We use the limited life span of humans to formulate a tem-
porally discretized model whose time steps correspond to 
real time periods of sufficient length (say, 150 years) so that 
a lack of personal overlap in human KTKK carriers between 
the time steps allows us to use replication as a model—social 
dynamics between these discretization points is summed 
up as a success or failure to pass knowledge on over that 
period of time. The rate of success is rendered by a fidelity 
parameter, and while KTKK fidelity (as opposed to, e.g., 
Knower-Knowledge (KTKK), meaning knowledge com-
ponents that can be gained only by personal contact with 
someone who possesses and expresses them; i.e., with a hu-
man cultural model. If we delimit tokens of technological 
knowledge, such as if we speak of “the knowledge to make 
an Acheulean biface,” then few if any tokens will consist of 
only KTKK. But on the other hand, very few tokens will not 
critically depend on some portion of KTKK.
Why is this so? While there is no obvious bound on how 
much technological knowledge that could be maintained 
externally to the knower, it is easy to think of knowledge 
components that cannot be represented externally at all. To 
illustrate why there had to be KTKK in any relevant tech-
nological knowledge tokens (not least before writing and 
pictographic instructions), let us briefly consider a set of 
elements identified by van der Leeuw (1993, 2000) as being 
necessary and sufficient for the production of Paleolithic 
technology—conceptualizations, tools, raw material, and ex-
ecutive functions—of these we will consider the first and the 
last category.
Conceptualizations involve three sub-components: 1) 
topology, which concerns the shape properties of what is be-
ing created; 2) sequence, which is the conception of structur-
ing the temporal and logical sequence of steps involved in 
the manufacture; and finally, 3) partonomy, which is the link 
between the parts of the object to be manufactured and the 
object itself. If we are barred from using writing and picto-
graphic explanations (indeed even if we are not), it is hard 
to conceive of an exclusively external medium for com-
municating in full these conceptual aspects of technology 
manufacture. While conceptualizations can be heavily scaf-
folded externally by the presence of persistent end-results 
and steps along the operational sequence (e.g., finished and 
unfinished lithic tools in the context of a manufacturing 
site), language is eminently suited for expressing, structur-
ing, and remembering sequences and systems as narratives 
that simply and economically tell us how to do.
Executive functions are the motor skills and strate-
gies that allow the knower to move conceptualizations 
into the real world, something that obviously involves 
tools and raw materials both intimately and reciprocally. 
The communication of executive functions is even harder 
to imagine in the absence of teacher and apprentice in di-
rect contact4. Indeed, externalization of executive functions 
remains a tough nut to crack even to this day, partly be-
cause more knowledge than we tend to think is supported 
by tacit components (see, e.g., Polanyi 1967) that are not 
just hard to verbalize and document but even to identify as 
possessed knowledge to begin with. No matter which craft 
you intend to learn, there is still no substitute to engaging 
in close interaction with a master—only then will crucial 
knowledge that neither master nor apprentice even recog-
nize as knowledge make it through.
The passage of all the detailed facts, distinctions, 
judgements, and motor skills that went into enculturat-
ing and training a Paleolithic technology knower would be 
unthinkable without liberal use of KTKK. In other words, 
even if it is impossible to conceive of Paleolithic technology 
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observed evolutionary stasis faces the same “Darwinian 
challenge” as do the preserved traces of our deep ancestry 
(see Poorly Explained Evolutionary Patterns above). Apart 
from making sequence length variable and subject to se-
lection, this expanded model is otherwise identical to the 
original model.
The model has a population T  of binary sequences 
Ti ∈τ  abstractly representing short-term storage of knowl-
edge. Each update cycle, a subset of these are selected, 
based on their fitness )( if τ , to replicate and produce off-
spring. Population size is conserved by an unbiased re-
moval of the same number of sequences. There are two 
selection pressures: 1) favoring master sequences (i.e., ho-
mogenous sequences of 0’s); and, 2) favoring longer mas-
ter sequences over shorter ones8. A sequence iτ  has fitness 
 )(=)( ii ANf ττ  if it belongs to the master sequence, oth-
erwise 1=)( if τ . )( iN τ  is the length of iτ . The parameter 
A, originally the height of the fitness peak, here also be-
comes a parameter controlling the strength of the selection 
pressure for longer sequences.
Sequences in the population are selected at a rate that 
is proportional to their fitness over the sum of all fitness 
values in the population. Upon being selected, an offspring 
is  replicated  from the parent subject to the per-bit fidelity 
q. Also, with probability r, a bit is either added or removed. 
Added bits are always adaptive 0’s—i.e., inventions are 
maximally intelligent, they are rational. Each update cycle, 
individual sequences furthermore undergo a cycle of rep-
lication and innovation with a certain probability d regard-
less of fitness to ensure that short-term memory carriers do 
not linger in the population.
Let us first discuss numerical results, then the ana-
lytical interpretation. With parameter values fixed, the se-
quence lengths soon reach a steady-state. In Figure 1 and 
Figure 2 we observe statistics of the lengths of the sequenc-
es in the population; 1=q  leads to an indefinite increase 
in N as selection pressures for longer master sequences are 
then unconstrained. In Figure 2 we reproduce a punctuated 
equilibrium pattern of sequence lengths with rapid transi-
tions triggered by the introduction of higher values of q. 
This tells us that the Glass Ceiling effect will cap evolution-
ary adaptation (when effected through KTKK expansion) 
also when no classical Darwinian reasons to expect such a 
cap obtain. Note here that during stasis in Figure 2, there 
is nothing that prevents longer master sequences from aris-
ing (and they do the whole time) and selection operates 
indefinitely in their favor. The efficacy of the selection pres-
sure reveals itself in the punctuation events when increases 
in q promptly bring about expansion up to the new Glass 
Ceiling level.
Using a smoother fitness landscape does not affect the 
qualitative behavior of the model—if departures from the 
master sequence give only small fitness effect (or that there 
is even a neutral plateau)9, this does not change the fact that 
we get a Glass Ceiling effect. What we then see is only a 
change in equilibrium N (whose numerical value is here in 
any case entirely fictive).
genetic fidelity) is highly challenging to measure empiri-
cally, the work by Eerkens and Lipo (2005) does bring hope 
in this respect—there are systematic ways to quantify and 
measure at least some aspects of the variability of knowl-
edge by proxy of their artifact manifestations.
Binary sequences, whose configurations represent 
KTKK content and whose lengths represent KTKK volume, 
are used as a simple knowledge model since this both suf-
fices for the present purposes6 and, moreover, allows us to 
remain close to the models following Eigen and Schuster 
(1977) and their results.
THE BASIC MODEL
A population of binary sequences is put under selection—
sequences homogenous in 0s (the master sequence) are fa-
vored and those that are selected are replicated subject to 
the per-bit replication fidelity q . By this we do not aim to 
model selection for improvements (the best configuration 
is present from the beginning) but rather how selection 
against degraded short-term knowledge safeguards long-
term memory.
What happens is basically that selection succeeds in re-
taining knowledge7 long-term as long as q remains above 
a critical value that depends on the length of the adapting 
sequences. But as soon as q drops below this value, the 
memory of the system suffers a complete breakdown—this 
event is referred to in the literature as the error catastrophe. 
The critical replication fidelity in Eigen’s model (Eigen and 
Schuster 1977; Nilsson and Snoad 2002) can be determined 
analytically to occur at
                      ,=
1
N
c Aq
−
            (1)
                                     
where N is the sequence length and A is the relative repro-
ductive advantage (fitness) of the master sequence (the fit-
ness peak) with non-master sequences having unit fitness.
But if we instead fix q we can solve for
            
 
;
ln
ln=
q
ANc −
          (2)
     
i.e., the critical sequence length. If  q remains fixed and 
selection pressures push for longer sequences, then this 
means that it must be expected that there will be an equilib-
rium sequence length. Above Nc the sequences fall prey to 
the error catastrophe and below they are out-competed by 
longer sequences, e.g., by more complex adaptations (more 
on this later).
AN EXPANDED MODEL
In the expanded model we want to investigate how the 
system behaves if q changes and: 1) the knowers are not 
constrained by any cognitive inability to invent longer se-
quences; and, 2) fitness increases indefinitely with sequence 
length. The idea is to have a simple model system where 
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Figure  1. A comparison between the analytical prediction of the relationship between N and q and numerical results from the simu-
lation model. The simulated data was produced using a simulation model using the following settings: population size of 10,000 
sequences out of which 2,000 were updated each round of selection; d=0.05, A=5, r=0.1. Initial sequence length was N=5. The data 
points show average N of master sequences in the population averaged over 5,000 selection cycles after equilibrium was determined 
to have been reached.
Figure  2. The response of sequence length N to imposed bumps in replication fidelity q is shown, the x axis represents number of 
update cycles. All aspects of the model are otherwise constant throughout the run. The response to changes in replication fidelity is 
rapid and results in transitions in the long-term memory capacity of the system. Settings and parameters used were the same as for 
Figure 1, but here showing a single simulation run over 120,000 update cycles where q was increased by 0.05 every 20,000 updates.
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of the underlying dynamics. There is not much room here 
for doing so, so we will have to limit ourselves to one big 
question—what evolutionary avenues on the level of homi-
nids and groups of hominids were available for adapting a 
toolbox under the Glass Ceiling?
So how would the Glass Ceiling Effect constrain the 
possible strategies for adaptation of technology? It would 
certainly not be a constraint on technological sophistication 
directly. In fact, it would not be a constraint on the quality 
or power of KTKK either, but on the “volume of KTKK,” 
which we said (see Knowledge and Information Dynamics 
above) corresponds approximately to the number of things 
that must be remembered to achieve a certain ability. That 
is, it would constrain something that otherwise would be a 
highly attractive avenue for increasing sophistication—the 
addition of more things (steps, criteria, relations, etc.) to re-
member.
With this in mind we may begin our inquiry quite ana-
lytically by suggesting three ways of maintaining (and in-
creasing) technological sophistication in the presence of the 
Glass Ceiling constraint:
1. Maintaining high fidelity in KTKK transfer to 
new generations of knowers; i.e., controlling the 
Glass Ceiling itself; 
2.  More elegant descriptions; i.e., making room un-
der a given Glass Ceiling level by reducing the 
space occupied by what is already there; and, 
3.  Using non-KTKK memory carriers with superior 
intrinsic persistence, such as stone; i.e., making 
room for more KTKK under the Glass Ceiling by 
moving other knowledge out from under it.
Strategies can, of course, combine these three catego-
ries and if they have been pursued this must be expected to 
have left traces behind. So we must ask whether the fossil 
and archaeological records are consistent with such strate-
gies.
MAINTAINING HIGH FIDELITY IN KTKK 
TRANSFER
A higher Glass Ceiling can be accomplished in only one 
way—by increasing the fidelity of KTKK transfer between 
generations. Once achieved, and once technological reli-
ance on a certain KTKK volume has developed, this fidel-
ity must then be maintained. High fidelity, in turn, can be 
realized in a large number of ways. Both social and biologi-
cal factors that affect the fidelity of knowledge transfer can 
be identified; many of these have obvious parallel benefits 
(which, as we will shortly discuss, is important) that could 
have driven their evolution12.
Among factors with a strong biological component we 
find language capability, which allows exactness, the ability 
to use narratives for structuring processes, and the abil-
ity to recount knowledge also in the absence of the objects 
that are involved (Donald 1991). Language with its classi-
fications, relations, and metaphors also has a tremendous 
structuring effect on the world as experienced by humans 
(e.g., Lévi-Strauss 1968; Lakoff 1987). Increased ability to 
conceptualize is important both for fidelity and descriptional 
We now turn to the analytical model to clarify certain 
relations. As opposed to in the original model, fitness is here 
a function of sequence length and this means that equilib-
rium sequence length (long-term memory capacity) is here 
a function of itself. Let us say we have a linear dependence 
between maximum fitness and sequence length10, A(N)=N. 
Recalling Equation (2) above, we then have
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For a given value of q the system will dynamically ap-
proach an attractor sequence length given by solving Equa-
tion (4) for N at the point where we have
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 'cN  should then give us the location of the Glass Ceil-
ing in the model. Just like Equaton (2), Equation (5) is a 
function of q but not of r; it is shown in Figure 1 that sim-
ulated equilibrium sequence lengths conform well to this 
analytical prediction. Furthermore, it is notable that Equa-
tion (5), contrary to Equation (2), is not a function of A. This 
means that the level of the Glass Ceiling is insensitive to the 
strength of the selection pressure on technology11.
Below the Glass Ceiling, sequences freely adapt while 
above it they evaporate. The inventiveness parameter r can 
furthermore do nothing to budge this Glass Ceiling—we 
see in Figure 1 that simulated sequence lengths are predict-
ed analytically by Equation (5) independent of r. Varying  r 
in the simulation model produces no equilibrium effect be-
yond the trivial effect at r=0 where longer sequences never 
appear. Intelligence is not a parameter here, but higher in-
telligence (which would be the relevant investigation here) 
is not possible since innovations are rational and the likeli-
hood of further invention remains constant regardless of N.
STRATEGIES FOR A LONG-TERM
TECHNOLOGICAL MEMORY
But while there is much that can be said on the abstract lev-
els of fitness and fidelity, and that is said with the greatest 
parsimony and clarity on such a level, there also is much 
that will evade us completely until we go into the details 
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an  opposing view, see also Read [2009]), but with a different 
causal role; this will be discussed later in some detail. Divi-
sion of labor and a higher degree of specialization also could 
improve fidelity because it would increase the amount of 
time available to single individuals learning, practicing, 
and teaching a narrower spectrum of knowledge. In other 
words, it would allow experts. Experts in combination with 
improved social organization also would allow more formal-
ized teacher roles with multiple students. Further research 
is, however, needed to understand what the actual effects 
of such a development could be. On the one hand, fidel-
ity would seem to increase if knowledge passes through a 
more narrow channel with a single version being spread to 
many students. On the other hand, redundancy would be 
reduced, counteracting another fidelity-increasing factor 
discussed above. As discussed already by Durkheim (e.g., 
in Durkheim 1984), the development of experts also could 
lead to an increasing sense of responsibility and identifi-
cation with a body of knowledge, the possession of which 
would make the person more unique within the group. 
However, increasing individuation at the same time brings 
the need for new means for social cohesion to avoid frag-
mentation of groups due to internal tension (Read 2003), 
which, as argued above, could lead to decreased fidelity. 
As a final example, sublimation of knowledge by associating 
it with religious beliefs and their imperatives can be a ma-
jor proximate mechanism for conservatism and the Glass 
Ceiling could be an ultimate reason for its emergence and 
persistence.
MORE ELEGANT DESCRIPTIONS
More elegant descriptions could reduce the volume of 
KTKK needed for carrying some technological capability. 
Reducing the number of things that we must keep in mem-
ory is something that we do cognitively the whole time to 
keep the world manageable and amenable to reasoning. 
We would be utterly unable to keep a sufficient number 
of relevant features of the world around us in our Short-
Term Working Memory (STWM), where we can manipu-
late it mentally (see, e.g., Coolidge and Wynn 2005), if we 
were not able to move up and down hierarchically between 
higher and lower levels of conceptualization.
Read and van der Leeuw (van der Leeuw 2000; Read 
and van der Leeuw 2008) make an interesting connection 
between the development of STWM that has taken place 
over the course of human evolution (Read 2008b) and tech-
nological capabilities. Chimpanzees (Pan paniscus/troglo-
dytes) are taken as marking an upper bound on the STWM 
of the earliest common ancestor shared with Homo sapiens 
and it is concluded that a development of STWM from 2±1 
in chimpanzees to a STWM of 7±2 in Homo sapiens has taken 
place over the past approximately six million years.
Of particular interest here is the proposed (Read and 
van der Leeuw 2008) connection between STWM evolution 
and work by Pigeot (1991). Pigeot attempted to determine 
what sort of conceptual machinery is minimally needed to 
conceive of artifacts characteristic of major technological 
stages and noted that there is an increase in dimensional-
elegance and will shortly be discussed in more detail under 
the latter rubric. Here we note that the ability to conceptu-
alize is, in a powerful way, not only important for invent-
ing new types of technology, but also for efficient learning 
from all sorts of sources. Learners capable of quickly and 
correctly “getting the point” open the door for the formula-
tion and use of more abstract, effective, and robust descrip-
tions; ability to reason recursively and to construct higher-
order concepts out of lower-order concepts is an example 
of this (see Read et al. 2009). The integrity of details over 
time in the knower’s neural memory (i.e., memories stored 
in the brain, available for cognitive recall and use) also is 
important because a more error-prone neural memory will 
demand more social error correction (Henrich and Boyd 
2002). A well-honed long-term memory of individuals is 
often reported from primitive cultures who lack writing as 
an aid (see, e.g., Lévi-Strauss 1968). Finally, as Mead (1999) 
argues, the ability to teach is much less widespread among 
animal species than the ability to learn, and the practice of 
simulational playing is highly developed in humans in con-
trast to other species (Donald 2001).
Predominantly cultural factors affecting fidelity in-
clude as their most obvious factor the amount of time and 
effort dedicated to teaching and learning. This variable is 
bounded by the requirement of time and effort for all the 
other tasks that need to be performed in the group. Of ad-
ditional interest is the time allocation dilemma between 
learning more knowledge less carefully or learning less 
knowledge more carefully. If more knowledge causes 
lower fidelity (diluted attention), but at the same time de-
mands more fidelity in order to survive long-term, then the 
emphasis must be expected to lie firmly on careful learning. 
Among cultural factors we also find conservatism as an at-
titude towards tampering with existing knowledge. Con-
servatism is often reported from modern primitive cultures 
(see, e.g., Mead 1999) and the technological conservatism 
of ancient Paleolithic cultures is clearly visible in the ar-
chaeological record. Bar-Yosef (2006), for example, brings 
to attention the remarkability of how even minute details 
in Middle Paleolithic châines opératoires have survived for 
time periods in excess of 40–50,000 years. The mechanisms 
behind conservatism have been studied by, for example, 
Ghirlanda et al. (2006) and Acerbi et al. (2009), who note 
that social conservatism may be self-perpetuating for the 
simplest of reasons—the conservative can be expected to be 
conservative also regarding its conservatism. Palmer (2010) 
describes how metatraditions, serving as a strong cultural 
inhibition against change, are common or even universal. 
We here add an external adaptive motivation for conser-
vatism. Mechanisms of error correction also have been dis-
cussed and studied by Boyd and Richerson (e.g., conform-
ist transmission [Boyd and Richerson 1985, 2005]). Larger 
social groups including trade networks and confederations 
of groups would have the effect of dispersing knowledge 
more widely. This could greatly diminish the likelihood of 
adaptive technology being lost. This importance of the size 
of communicating populations in this role has been stressed 
also by, e.g., Henrich (2004) and Powell et al. (2009) (but for 
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pacity to carry language (or for that matter gestures, sen-
sory information, and so on), external knowledge carriers 
in the Paleolithic were still limited in scope and powerful 
only as a scaffolding component together with other forms 
of knowledge within a knowledge system.
THE EVOLUTION OF FIDELITY
In this study we concentrate of the effects of fidelity rath-
er than on the evolution of fidelity, which is an interest-
ing question in itself and in need of further research. But 
in order to understand better what fidelity means here, we 
should still briefly discuss its evolution and in particular 
how it could plausibly be suspected to often remain quite 
constant. Let us begin with the question of why selection 
would not just favor fidelity by proxy of its technological 
effects. Let us consider the related case of the evolution of 
human cognition. The fact that cognitive capabilities must 
precede any technological fruits that they open the door 
for, and that cognition evolution is thereby not easily driv-
en by selection for its technological effects, has been dis-
cussed by e.g., Alvard (2003). Cognitive powers, however, 
have many social and societal uses (e.g., “Machiavellian” 
intelligence, see de Waal 1982) where their fitness effects 
are much more immediate. The situation is analogous in 
the case of technology driving adaptations leading to in-
creased fidelity. Lifting the Glass Ceiling will no doubt be 
highly adaptive in terms of the technology that is thereby 
made possible. But, a potential benefit is not yet a benefit—
the fitness of technology materializes only once such tech-
nology has actually had time to develop. Note that Figure 
2 does not provide any hints into this dynamic. Fidelity in 
the present model is just a parameter. When we raise it we 
simply postulate that it is raised, and Figure 2 shows the 
effect on sequence length of doing so.
To make matters worse, many of the factors (see above) 
that could affect fidelity would carry a substantial cost (de-
manding time, attention, resources, and so on) that their ef-
fects first must offset. So, because no immediate technologi-
cal benefit can be expected, whatever lifts the Glass Ceiling 
must first survive on other merits. Then, once a more com-
plex technology (dependent on this higher fidelity) has 
established itself and is spread widely, the benefit of this 
technology would guard against the loss of the new factor 
maintaining fidelity. Preliminary simulations confirm this 
(essentially letting q in the model undergo variation and 
assigning a fitness effect directly to it)—with no cost related 
to q, technological selection can act and rapidly maximizes 
q and N with it. But even at very low costs, q is minimized 
despite strong selection pressures for technology. The sys-
tem is then indeed altogether insensitive to the pressure for 
technology since it never gets the chance to kick in in the 
first place.
THE GLASS CEILING FROM THE HOMINID 
PERSPECTIVE
Another pressing question is that of how the Glass Ceil-
ing can be expected to have been experienced by those liv-
ing under it. The short answer is that various cultural and 
ity over time—Early Oldowan flaking can be accomplished 
with the concepts of a point and an angle, later we move to 
an edge (late Oldowan), to a surface (late Acheulean), and 
finally to a volume (prismatic blades, Upper Paleolithic). 
What Read and van der Leeuw argue is that the ability to 
juggle these conceptualizations in memory depends criti-
cally on STWM size. But apart from representing an in-
creasing scale of sophistication of thought, this also repre-
sents a corresponding sophistication of description.
As biology teaches us, a lack of conceptualization abil-
ity itself does not explain why something or the other failed 
to evolve or why all detectable expansion of knowledge 
halted at a certain point. For example, we do not ask at 
which point the molecular basis of genes got the cognitive 
capability to conceive of vertebrates. We could in principle 
envision robot-like instructions for how to make a surface 
based only on points. Rather than saying “remove flakes to 
make a surface that looks like this,” we would have to say 
“remove flakes here, here, here, here...,” and so on. Such 
an extensive and low-dimensional instruction would chal-
lenge our memory and patience more than it would our 
wits. But would it fit into the long-term cultural memory?
The results here indicate that at some point it would 
not. The former description is not only much more flexible 
and robust, it is also shorter and easier to remember—it has 
a smaller KTKK footprint and is more adapted to survive 
long-term in a noisy transmission environment. In other 
words, by the exact same merits that moving from low- 
to high-level conceptualization simplifies thinking (to the 
point of making at all possible), it also would have another 
and at least as important effect—a dramatic effect on the 
economy of descriptions, and thereby on the potential for 
technological complexity.
USING NON-KTKK MEMORY CARRIERS
The king of non-KTKK memory carriers is, of course, writ-
ing, which commits language—the most human of all 
knowledge vectors—to an external existence where it does 
not require the presence of (and can outlive) its originator. 
Writing, of course, emerged long after the time period that 
we are considering here, but there are other external knowl-
edge carriers that were used earlier and that are likely to 
have pulled a heavy load. In fact, it has been proposed that 
the external world is so essential to the mind that it makes 
sense to conceptualize it as an “extended mind;” i.e., as 
something that fundamentally comprises the environment 
and the brain (Clark and Chalmers 1998; Menary 2010; but 
also Polanyi 1967). Maintaining artifacts as models would, 
for example, be a realistic external knowledge storage 
method. Even if the old tools could not convey how they 
were made directly, they could at least provide an example 
of what the end-result should look like. It also is possible to 
imagine more finely grained schemes where tools on differ-
ent points during their manufacture were stored as models 
so that the sequence of steps involved could be even more 
firmly supported (see, e.g., Read 2008a). A cheap version 
of this could simply be the maintenance of manufacturing 
sites over long periods of time. However, without the ca-
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have in common that they identify population density as 
the important causal factor; something that is also one of 
the factors that are here argued to affect fidelity and there-
by technological refinement. Let us briefly discuss how 
these models differ from the present model by considering 
Henrich’s (2004) model; the other models cited above differ 
in very similar ways.
Henrich’s model examines the dynamics of technologi-
cal skill with the proximate purpose of explaining the loss 
of technology in Tasmania after its geographical separation 
from Australia around 10,000 years ago, and the ultimate 
purpose of much wider applicability. In Henrich’s model, 
it is the evolution of a continuous quantification of tech-
nological skill that is observed: “This [zi, i.e. the skill of an 
individual i] could be a quantitative measure of a skill like 
how straight an arrow shaft is, or it could measure the pos-
session of several discrete skills.” Using Price’s equation 
(Price 1970, 1972), the equation expressing change in skill 
under selection is rendered:
                )),(ln(= Nz ++−∆ εβα
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where α and β roughly correspond respectively to how 
hard something is to learn and the variability in learning 
performance among the population. N here denotes pop-
ulation size. Knowledge degradation from factors that in 
the present paper are treated as affecting fidelity is simply 
summed up in the α parameter—something that is hard to 
learn is assumed (quite reasonably) to degrade more quick-
ly than something that is easy to learn.
It is interesting to consider briefly how the models map 
onto each other. The parameter α in Henrich’s model com-
bines features of fidelity and the volume of KTKK, and an α 
value for a whole group would be akin to sequence length 
in our model. However, KTKK and sequence length would 
partially have to do also with z since this inclusive parame-
ter lumps together both the width and the depth of techno-
logical repertoires. The amount of knowledge is hence not 
quantified separately in Henrich’s model, and, as a conse-
quence, phenomena concerning knowledge volume cannot 
be studied. While β has affinities with the fidelity param-
eter q in our model, the similarity does not go all the way as 
it only captures a limited aspect of fidelity. Degradation of 
knowledge is in Henrich’s model assumed to be a smooth 
process—it is the quality of technological systems that can 
vary. But the disappearance of, say, fishing nets means that 
the very idea of such a thing disappears. From such a state 
of non-existence, its quality clearly cannot be adjusted up-
wards. In Henrich’s model, technologies would drop out of 
repertoires because they could not evolve (negative  z∆ )—
they would decline to a state where, presumably (since it 
is not internalized in the model), they would be eliminated 
because they were no longer of any use.
Henrich’s model thereby hides the Glass Ceiling effect 
studied here, which in terms of Henrich’s model would be 
best viewed as an upper bound on z due to limitations to 
the KTKK it is based on. Indeed, in the problem formula-
physiological adaptations to its presence would affect daily 
life greatly but that the Glass Ceiling effect itself would be a 
long-term phenomenon far outside of the realm of the com-
prehensible.
With technology constrained by the Glass Ceiling be-
fore and differently than cognitive capability would con-
strain it, hominids would have the cognitive potential for 
technology of higher complexity (possibly considerably 
higher) than what they could stably maintain a long-term 
cultural memory of. This would not just be an idle capa-
bility however, and it would be an excess only relative to 
technology. It would be used to the ends that had driven 
its evolution; perhaps most importantly, the multitude of 
social interactions of complex hominid societies, which 
would have tremendous and very direct ordinary Darwin-
ian fitness consequences.
If hominids constantly invented new things (which 
there is evidence that they did; see Hovers and Kuhn 
[2006]), these inventions would tend not to “stick;” mean-
ing they would not fit in under the Glass Ceiling. As soon 
as anything did stick, congestion under the Glass Ceiling 
would increase the likelihood of something else being 
lost, and a long-term equilibrium would ensue. This is, 
however, something that happens over the long term and 
that may have been anything but obvious from the point 
of view of individual hominids with a reliable historical 
memory of specific events and facts of a few generations 
at the most. They may have existed in a persistent cloud of 
inventions with a transient content, possibly under a per-
petual illusion of progress since they would not know that 
their inventions had been invented uncountable times in 
the past (hence the metaphor of a Glass Ceiling). Things in 
the cultural analog of the Vygotskian zone of proximal de-
velopment (Vygotsky 1978) of their repertoire might have 
been repeatedly re-invented as needed in a quite persistent 
way. Indeed, a core technology conducive to ad hoc adapta-
tion for short-term needs may have been favored because it 
would in this way emulate a more complex technology. If 
the environment changed, or if a group migrated to other 
areas, this innovation cloud (and the excess intelligence 
that made it possible) would be the variational fodder for 
quickly adjusting the makeup of their repertoire to meet 
new needs. This would also mean that the technological 
transitions that seem so dramatic from our coarse-grained 
vantage point might not even have been noticeable on the 
ground—the particles of the ever-present innovation cloud 
just began to stick for a while until the new equilibrium 
level was reached; possibly many generations later and be-
yond the reach of first-hand witness reports.
RELATED MODELS
Even if the question of knowledge retention has not been 
raised in its own right, the question of what circumstanc-
es may bring about technological refinement and decline, 
and what may cause refinement to be bounded, has been 
addressed in a series of models, beginning with Shennan 
(2001), with some affinities to the model used here. These 
models (Shennan 2001; Henrich 2004; Powell et al. 2009) 
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could have been rather constant over long periods 
of time, see The Evolution of Fidelity (above). If 
fidelity remains constant, then, as long as the se-
lection pressure for better technology is reasonably 
strong, the expressed technological complexity 
should be expected to be pushed upwards against 
this Glass Ceiling. 
• C: Higher fidelity causes rapid increase in expressed 
technology complexity: punctuations. If the selection 
pressure for more complex technology is reason-
ably strong, then an increase in fidelity would 
have a rapid (on the order of tens or hundreds, 
rather than thousands, of generations) effect on 
the amount of technological knowledge held by 
the culture in question. That this phenomenon is 
sufficient on its own to bring about punctuations 
is demonstrated in Figure 2, where the only thing 
that changes along the run is the fidelity—the abil-
ity and propensity to invent, as well as the adaptive 
value of doing so, remains the same. 
• D: The Glass Ceiling does not affect the ability to adapt 
as long as net KTKK volume is conserved. Fidelity con-
cerns only how faithfully knowledge is reproduced 
and the amount of KTKK that can thereby be main-
tained long-term. This involves no assumptions 
about the content of this knowledge and its inter-
nal composition should be open for change as long 
as KTKK volume is conserved. Hence, there is no 
reason to believe that adaptation, as long as the to-
tal amount of knowledge does not increase, would 
be precluded by this constraint. 
• E: Hominid technology complexity generally lower 
than cognitive potential to invent. If intelligence was 
driven by social factors and the complexity of ex-
pressed technology was bounded well before being 
limited by some cognitive potential maximum so-
phistication, then hominids would generally have 
been smarter than what their technological traces 
lead us to believe. We know this is the case today 
and that it is the case with chimpanzees (Belfer-
Cohen and Hovers 2010). 
• F: Going-nowhere-fast and local adaptation while over-
all technological complexity static. Importantly, con-
clusion D means that the present model is in no 
way inconsistent with innovation during periods 
of overall stasis or with the ability of hominids to 
adapt to new environments encountered as a re-
sult of migration or ecological change. In this view, 
inventiveness and adaptation under a stable Glass 
Ceiling is expected to yield adaptive and KTKK-
volume-neutral change but not more complex 
repertoires. An “excess intelligence” would in 
this respect indeed likely be highly adaptive—it is 
easier to adapt a toolbox that many users can eas-
ily master than to adapt a toolbox that is beyond 
everybody except exceptionally gifted and highly 
trained individuals. 
• G: Mechanisms for strong technological conservatism 
tion used in the present paper, Henrich’s model would 
predict that technology tokens for which conditions were 
ripe (see Figure 2 of Henrich 2004) would increase in qual-
ity indefinitely13. There is no limitation to the potential for 
increasing z for those technologies that make this quality 
cut (positive  z∆ ) and there is no addressing of the question 
of how many technology tokens can be maintained—the 
model is applied only to the tokens individually. To explain 
prolonged periods of stasis in Henrich’s model, we would 
have to explain how z-value would first be positive to gen-
erate the technological equilibrium level and then how they 
suddenly all changed to close to 0 and remained there over 
very long periods of time and over large geographical ar-
eas. Rather than implying an infinite cultural memory, the 
question of memory that is raised in the present paper is 
simply not represented in Henrich’s model.
The results of Henrich’s model and the other cited 
models demonstrate a type of mechanism that affects the 
speed and direction of evolutionary refinement of func-
tion. The present model calls into question the validity of 
assuming that increasing z (in its spectrum of meanings) is 
uncomplicated. To the extent that an increasing z implies a 
need for more KTKK memory, as it would eventually have 
to (even if not at all times and in every specific case, see 
Strategies for a Long-Term Technological Memory above), 
then z would be bounded upwards by the Glass Ceiling. 
This bound would not be expressible within these models. 
The present model predicts that for the Tasmanian case 
(assuming Henrich’s account of it to be correct; see Read 
2006, 2009) it would indeed be the population size drop 
that caused the technological decline, but, by lowering the 
Glass Ceiling such that the original repertoire was too large 
to fit under its new level and with this an elimination of the 
technologies that were least critically needed would likely 
happen.
CONCLUSIONS, PROPOSITIONS
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Items A-D are results that follow quite directly from the 
abstract models. Items E-J offer new takes on some of the 
recalcitrant empirical observations briefly reviewed (as 
stylized facts) in Poorly Explained Evolutionary Patterns 
(above). Finally, items K-M are miscellaneous predictions 
with varying degree of support at the present but that are 
still of interest. We are here concerned primarily with what 
the present model has to say about these problems and 
space does not allow any deeper and wider review of alter-
native explanations that have been proposed.
• A: Strong dependency between fidelity and the amount 
of knowledge that can be maintained long-term. This 
is the central point of this paper and it is argued 
throughout. 
• B: Temporally stable fidelity: the Glass Ceiling. If, as 
argued in Strategies for a Long-Term Technological 
Memory (above), fidelity either comes as a result of 
physiological changes or as a result of costly cul-
tural novelty, and that it is not easily selected for 
on the basis of its technology effects, then fidelity 
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of one or a small number of generations, glimpses 
of an “excess intelligence” may have been reflected 
directly in transient technology. For example, giv-
en result E, a seafaring H. erectus (Bednarik 2003) 
might have been possible even if no technology 
even remotely approaching that level of complex-
ity had any hopes of being retained over time. The 
technology itself might be archaeologically un-
detectable and would leave traces only insofar as 
it caused something of lasting merit, such as the 
settlement of previously uninhabited parts of the 
world. 
• I: “Transitional cultures”: primitives adopting bits and 
pieces of more modern culture. The fateful encounter 
between modern H. sapiens and H. neanderthalensis 
easily conjures up the image of conquest, domi-
nance, and enslavement where Moderns invaded 
Europe with superior weaponry and social organi-
zation. In reality the process took several millennia 
and the above imagery is probably too inspired by 
later eras with entirely other resources and levels 
of social coordination (such as the return of the 
Europeans to Africa much later). Finding out what 
really happened in these encounters is a question 
that attracts a lot of attention and perhaps the most 
suggestive lead is provided by the so-called “transi-
tional cultures” of Europe and Western Asia where 
superficial Aurignacian elements were patched 
onto fundamentally Mousterian toolboxes. This, 
and not least reports of personal ornamentation 
(White 2000), is also troublesome from the tradi-
tional point of view on technological evolution. 
If both species did not exploit their full cognitive 
capability for technology, the encounter between 
H. sapiens and H. neanderthalensis (and possibly yet 
other hominid species, Krause et al. [2010]) might 
have been little different than encounters between 
H. sapiens groups with different social and tech-
nological characteristics14. For the MSA/MP this is 
suggested by studies of settlements in the Levant 
(Bar-Yosef 2000) and later on the rate of spread of 
UP technology is remarkably similar on both sides 
of the Mediterranean converging on the Gibraltar 
Strait (Bar-Yosef and Pilbeam 2000). Telling the dif-
ference between peaceful assimilation of the new 
technology and its spread by displacement is not 
easy unless the identities of the groups in interac-
tion can be kept track of, such as through skeletal 
differences. Under the present thesis, it is quite 
possible that both Neanderthals and Moderns op-
erated technologically well under their capabil-
ity15—we do know for certain that the latter did, 
but we seem to assume without further qualifica-
tion that the former did not. So it could be that Ne-
anderthals (and for that matter culturally archaic 
H. sapiens) managed to adopt bits and pieces but 
were still unable to copy the bulk of the technology 
of the invaders—not because they were more stu-
The Glass Ceiling provides an explanation for why 
strong technological conservatism would have 
been adaptive. One may also infer that the more 
basic a technological operation was, the more heav-
ily it would have been guarded from alteration. As 
they undergo adaptation, early and fundamental 
stages in technological or organical systems under-
go what Wimsatt (1999) calls “generative entrench-
ment.” This means that as more and more derived 
structures of adaptive value become dependent 
on the specifics of the basic structures (e.g., later 
stages being dependent on earlier stages in châines 
opératoires), the harder it will be to alter the basic 
structures—change in a basic structure cascades 
to more derived structures but not the other way 
around. 
• H: Recursive technology elements characteristic of later 
industries. As briefly reviewed in Poorly Explained 
Evolutionary Patterns (above), the early appear-
ance of sophistication is theoretically troublesome 
because this should be strictly impossible if cog-
nition were the main constraint on technology. 
Under the view proposed here this is no longer 
the case and there are at least two distinct mecha-
nisms that could give rise to such premature so-
phistication: 1) locally narrow specialization; and, 
2) technological forays during a small number of 
generations that were doomed over the long run 
but nevertheless made their mark on history. As 
for mechanism 1, local conditions must be expect-
ed to vary temporally and geographically and this 
means that in some times and places, the environ-
ment could offer a rich but more narrow range of 
resources (such as, say, dependence on large fish 
suitable for spearing). Adaptation to such an envi-
ronment with a conserved overall KTKK volume 
would mean that more space would be available to 
a narrow range of technology. Trade could more-
over produce the same effect if over-production 
of narrow technology could be traded for comple-
menting technological imports. Technologies could 
then develop into a sophistication that under more 
typical circumstances would not be possible; the 
MSA holds possible examples of this, see Poorly 
Explained Evolutionary Patterns (above). Later, 
with a larger technological memory, the same level 
of sophistication could consequently appear at a 
lower degree of adaptive importance. This also ex-
plains why it is characteristic for such occurrences 
to be isolated in space and time. Space: neighbor-
ing groups in areas where the technology had a 
lower utility could not “afford” the technology as 
its adoption would mean that they would have to 
get rid of other technologies to make room for it. 
Time: when the local environment changed, the 
utility of this technology may have diminished and 
the atypical level of sophistication would no longer 
be possible. As for mechanism 2, within the course 
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margins for survival are small would be less likely 
to see the emergence of new institutions that only 
much later would provide a technological benefit. 
Periods of more abundant resources would likely 
relax the selection pressure for better technology 
(but hardly eliminate it), but, on the other hand, 
it could also provide a honeymoon both for new 
social mechanisms with a chance of increasing fi-
delity and for experimentation with novel artifacts. 
Since selection for technology probably in any case 
was a poor driver for fidelity (see The Evolution of 
Fidelity above), and since the Glass Ceiling level is 
relatively insensitive to selection pressure (see An 
Expanded Model above)16, the latter can be predict-
ed to be more important than the former. Besides, 
in historical times, development has emerged from 
expansive cities and city systems rather than out of 
impoverished and backward areas with great im-
mediate needs (see, e.g., Jacobs 1969, 1984). 
•  M: Economy of description/design and the use of exter-
nal knowledge storage were highly evolved. Although 
not all types of knowledge could be stored exter-
nally, and although sophistication of representa-
tion is possible only to a point, one must expect 
that the evolutionary incentive to use these ave-
nues would be great under an inflexible Glass Ceil-
ing. KTKK would be a scarce and needed resource 
and it would likely come to be used as wisely as 
possible, including using parts of it for precisely 
the meta-purpose of enabling sophistication of de-
scription and use of external knowledge storage 
to still yield a net KTKK memory gain. A simple 
example can be found already in the development 
of abstract technology, such as prepared cores and 
blanks. These are not tools themselves but useful 
because they can be specialized into wide ranges of 
tools. It follows that many steps of the operational 
sequence do not bring us closer to any particular 
tool at all, but to such abstract way-points. This 
does have a distinct effect of storing technologi-
cal knowledge hierarchically rather than linearly; 
technically the memory storage complexity would 
go from N to Log(N) (Figure 3). 
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ENDNOTES
1. Although bifaces are not strictly lacking east of the Movius Line, they 
are considerably more rare in East Asia than elsewhere in the Old 
World and are moreover morphologically different from their coun-
terparts west of the Movius Line (see Norton et al. 2006).
2. Meaning that they emerge only to be lost at a later time without lead-
ing to further development; not to be confused with recursive as in 
recursive thinking. Recurrent technology widely separated in time 
and space clearly suggest separate re-invention rather than retention, 
pid (they may or may not have been) but because 
they lacked some cultural or physiological fidelity-
boosting feature. 
• J: Time lags between physiological and technological 
transitions. The poor synchronization between new 
hominid species and new technological regimes is 
mysterious under the assumption that technology 
was the main driver of cognitive evolution. We are 
slightly better off if social interactions are viewed 
as the driver of cognition evolution, but even then 
we must wonder why new cognitive capabilities 
were not promptly put to use in technology. The 
view that becomes possible by taking the Glass 
Ceiling effect into account is that, in order to bring 
about a transition, a fidelity boost also was needed, 
and that such a boost would neither follow auto-
matically with new cognitive capabilities nor could 
be easily driven by selection for technology. That 
is, the needed fidelity boost would have to arise 
as a by-effect of something completely different; 
something that could pay up front in the currency 
of fitness. This means that we could search in vain 
for direct causes for technological revolutions that 
would explain why they happened there and then 
rather than elsewhere at other points in time—the 
cause could be culturally endogenous and have 
nothing to do with technology or the need thereof. 
Hidden adaptations, such as proposed by Klein 
and Edgar (2002), are in no way ruled out, but nei-
ther are they required in every and all transitions. 
This is an advance since there are other serious 
problems, see Poorly Explained Evolutionary Pat-
terns (above), with such an explanation for transi-
tions. 
• K: Small populations should tend to be less technologi-
cally complex than large populations. We here reach 
this conclusion in a different way than the models 
reviewed in Related Models (above). As discussed 
in Maintaining High Fidelity in KTKK Transfer 
(above), it can be expected that redundant short-
term storage should make effective fidelity higher. 
That is, if one person or group fails to properly 
learn to reproduce a technology, then a larger 
population means that there is a higher chance that 
the knowledge survived elsewhere and may be re-
introduced. The ability to tie together large popu-
lations could change drastically, if, for example, a 
qualitatively new cultural mechanism for amicable 
group interaction suddenly arose, or more prosai-
cally with varying carrying capacity of the environ-
ment. 
• L: Times of plenty should be more likely to trigger tech-
nological revolutions than times of dearth. It was dis-
cussed in The Model (above), in particular Equa-
tion 5, that the strength of the selection pressure for 
technology is relatively unimportant as long as it 
is reasonably high. Hence, if social boosts of fidel-
ity tend to come at a cost, then periods where the 
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used for different functional forms and verify that the sensitivity is 
low.
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